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Abstract 
 
nterconnected business and trade routes, or “bamboo networks” 
have long been recognised as engines of growth in Asia. However, 
as Asian migration expands to Africa, what are their impact? This paper 
examines the links between trade flows and Taiwanese migration in 
South Africa from 1975 to 1995. Constructing a bilateral trade series 
from novel declassified migration and trade data, two aspects of the 
change in trade are quantified: Firstly, how did international trade 
change during sanctions, vis-à-vis South Africa and its largest OECD 
trading partners? Secondly, using migration data, I examine the extent 
to which the 1975 immigration of Taiwanese investors to South Africa 
could have increased and diversified trade between the two countries 
through their investment. Three years after the lifting of sanctions, the 
share of South African exports to Taiwan was both greater, but 
importantly more diversified in the sectors in which migrants invested. 
Using archival accounts, I discuss the possible processes through 
which these changes to trade could have occurred. Known as the 
migrant-trade effect, the results suggest that Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
increased trade by forming business networks and supply chains 
linking them to Asian markets. 
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“Using their vast trading networks; businessmen, industrialists and technologists 
of Chinese extraction are playing an increasingly constructive role in the 
development of a modern South Africa.” 1 
 
Minister K.T. Li, 
Taiwanese Minister of Finance and Minister without Portfolio. January 1980 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Starting in 1975, trade between South Africa and Taiwan substantially increased and 
then began diversifying following ethnic Chinese migration to special economic zones. 
This may have naturally occurred as “Isolated State Geo-Politics” took hold when 
South Africa faced international sanctions and Taiwan was expelled from the United 
Nations, forcing the countries closer together.2 Although not causal, Figure 3 in 
Appendix A, demonstrates how the migration to South Africa may have been 
accompanied by an increase in bilateral trade between South Africa and Asia.  
 
Using a novel dataset, I first benchmark the interdependence of South Africa’s trade, 
relative to several of its larger, former ‘colonial’ and now OECD trading partners and 
then the subsequent growth with Taiwan.3 Second, using new migration data, I 
examine the extent to which the immigration of Taiwanese investors increased and but 
also diversified trade between the two countries. Finally, using archival accounts, I 
discuss the possible processes through which these changes occurred. I conclude that 
network linkages helped Taiwanese investors overcome informal barriers to trade, and 
were thus able to leverage existing business links, in turn, diversifying South Africa’s 
exports. Export diversity continued after sanctions and the special economic zones 
were terminated.  
 
This work makes a contribution in two ways: First, no prior research has been able to 
extract data delving into the possible causes for this shift in trade during apartheid. In 
one related study, Garner (1994) noted how they “were unable to ascertain whether the 
change reflected the activity of Taiwanese-owned firms, or switching activity from 
other trade partners, specifically Japan.” 4 At the time, Garner questioned whether he 
                                                        
1 Minister K.T. Li notes in a parliamentary speech to South Africa that Taiwanese entrepreneurs have the 
advantage of “vast networks to expand trade which can be very constructive in manufacturing development.” 
Quote excerpted from a 1980 newspaper article in the New China Times.  
2 Both countries were on the periphery of geopolitics. South Africa was a pariah because of its racist policies, 
while Taiwan lost international recognition as China in the United Nations. Geldenhuys (1991) uses this phrase 
as the title of his book “Isolated States: a comparative analysis” in which he compares the trade and geo-political 
strategies of ROC, RSA, Chile & Israel in the 1980s.  
3 Sample Country Set: UK, Germany, France, United States, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong.  
4 Garner (1994, p. iii)  
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change in bilateral trade reflected the activity of Taiwanese-owned firms.5 As such the 
combination of new archival trade and migration statistics can possibly provide an 
answer to this question in South Africa’s apartheid economic history. Second, 
Taiwanese migrant trade networks were a unique phenomenon in South Africa. 
Taiwanese co-ethnic networks were easy to identify as South Africa had previously 
only a very small Chinese population before 1975 and limited bilateral trade. As such, 
South Africa is well placed as a case study of how Asian foreign investment and mass 
migration are interlinked with co-ethnic networks and the growth in export trade.  
 
An international body of scholarship on migration, trade and investment has examined 
this effect in other markets. For example, Rauch and Casella (2001) found that ethnic 
Asian business networks had a significant impact on the volume of trade across North 
American borders. By enabling traders to overcome informational trade barriers, these 
migrant networks matched opportunities in international markets. Very little is known, 
however, about how Taiwanese investment may have had an impact on South Africa’s 
exports, and to what degree diversification was driven by migration. In addition, a vast 
empirical literature shows the contribution of export diversification to economic 
growth, which is especially beneficial to developing countries in Africa. Gutiérrez de 
Piñeres and Ferrantino (1997) explain that the progression from ‘traditional’ to ‘non-
traditional’ exports is an important component of export-led growth.6 A varied export 
production structure which includes new, but also higher value products enables 
positive manufacturing spillovers, making countries less susceptible to commodity 
shocks.7 South Africa, however, struggled to develop export-led manufacturing with 
commodities crowding out consumer goods and the continued failure of import 
substitution.8 
 
Historically, business networks have been fundamental in the development of trade. 
Notable authors such as Greif (1994) and Gould (1994) have shown that informal 
and formal business networks play an increasing role in economic activities, 
providing alternatives to organised markets. Buyers and sellers establish personal 
links, and conduct trade on a bilateral basis, expanding international trade through a 
greater knowledge of local market preferences and ensuring contract enforcement. 
This has been a growing topic in economic history with Weidenbaum and Hughes 
(1996) showing how expatriate Chinese entrepreneurs, using the ‘bamboo network’, 
                                                        
5 Garner (1994, p. 6) notes that without granular trade data (SIC) or country-specific volumes of trade, this 
research merely conjectured whether the reorientation was a result of the Taiwanese firms.  
6 South Africa, and Africa in general terms export commodities. As such, Gutiérrez de Piñeres & Ferrantino 
(1997, p. 376) note that ‘non-traditional’ industries are presumed to be in manufacturing.  
7 Reis & Farole (2012, p. 11 - 28)  
8 Moll (1991, p. 283) explains that the export of mining machinery did not take place. Dietz (1992, p. 236) 
noted that the inability to develop a capital goods sector meant that once mining declined and sanctions took 
hold very little new investment occurred in South African manufacturing.  
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created a trade superpower in Asia.9 These connections improved communication, 
knowledge, and the transfer of capital, especially in regions where the businesses 
may be in the minority and rule of law remain undeveloped, such as apartheid South 
Africa. More recently Vézina and Parsons (2016) used the Vietnamese boat people 
in the United States as a natural experiment, showing how these immigrants fostered 
international trade between the US and Asia by reducing trade costs and increasing 
exports. However Bräutigam (2003) notes that very limited research has been done 
on [co-ethnic] Chinese business networks in Africa. As such, my case studies of 
Taiwanese migration and the growth in trade with Asia are the first examples of 
‘bamboo shoots’ which have established trade networks in South Africa.  
 
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 provides the historical and 
theoretical context to trade and migration in South Africa. Section 3 details the 
underlying data collection and research methodology. Section 4 analyses the 
assimilated bilateral trade data. Section 5 is a discussion on the evolution of trade 
and the role of migrant trade and business networks.  
 
2 Historical context  
 
South Africa’s economy was traditionally characterised by its openness with a long 
history of trade and migration. Throughout the twentieth century South Africa’s trade 
with its former colonial and western OECD partners had played a crucial role in the 
growth of the economy. 10 In exchange for the export of gold, diamonds and an 
assortment of minerals, South Africa imported capital equipment and technology. 11 
From 1925 to 1973, the government pursued an active policy of import substitution 
to stimulate domestic manufacturing with state investment in key sectors. 12 Edwards 
and Lawrence (2008) note how this trade protection had seriously impeded both 
exports and imports.  
 
By 1970s the economy became increasingly sluggish with export trade in minerals 
and manufacturing declining further. 13 Sanctions then began to take their toll in 
1974, as it became increasingly difficult to raise offshore financing for both the 
private and public sectors. 14 First Switzerland imposed a cap on credit extensions to 
                                                        
9 The bamboo network is traced to the 16th century, and can be thought of as a Chinese Commonwealth. The 
concept has been used to describe how businesses which are operated by overseas Chinese act as conduits for 
trade which are then guided by family ties and personal relationships as opposed to formal relationships.  
10 A large proportion (64% in 1979) of South Africa’s bilateral trade was with OECD countries - mainly Western 
Europe, North America and Japan.  
11 Feinstein (2005)  
12 ISKOR (iron & steel), ESKOM (electricity), SAPPI (forestry & paper) and SASOL (fuels & Chemicals)  
13 Jones (2002, p. 115) explains that the decline of manufacturing in the 1970s was closely related to the output 
and price of gold. 
14 United Nations Centre Against Apartheid (1978) United Nations Centre Against International Conference on 
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South Africa. 15 This was followed by Midland Bank in 1975, halting loans to the 
government or its agencies, which intensified in 1978 to all counterparties with any 
South African activity. Havemann (2014) notes that the most ominous gestures came 
in 1978 when a number of banks in the United States terminated all loans. 
Compounding this was an IMF prohibition of loans in 1978. As a result, Western 
investors, fearful of growing financial and political instability began to withdraw 
funds or to move it into short-term rather than long-term investments.  
 
In 1975 some significant changes to South Africa’s trade relationships began to occur 
in individual rankings; in response to sanctions but also through a reorientation of 
trading partners. Both Britain and Japan declined, with Taiwan becoming the fastest 
growing trading partner to South Africa during the period.16 Moreover, South Africa 
had historically traded homogenous, reference-price products, such as mineral ores 
in global markets, while failing to develop competitive manufacturing exports. 
Following the signing of ROC - RSA trade treaties in 1976, migration grew rapidly. 
As part of a “chain migration”17, Hart (2002b) found this that large cohort of 
Taiwanese investors were deeply connected to their homeland and sites across East 
Asia. 
 
For example, clusters of Taiwanese-owned factories were established in a select set 
of the special economic zones (RIDP zones) producing manufactured goods for 
exports. These migrants brought with them product knowledge of foreign (Asian) 
markets, new labour-intensive production methods, and trading networks. Urban 
trading companies sprang up in major metropolitan areas to meet the raw input 
demands of Taiwanese firms, and to support cross-border transactions.  
 
The ethnic Chinese community in South Africa was a very small, silent minority 
prior to1975.18 This, however, began to change with the influx of Taiwanese 
investment. South Africa was in the process of reviving the domestically unpopular 
decentralisation programme during the late 1970s, which sought to shift labour-
intensive industries to the most rural African homelands. The RIDP attracted the 
attention of small-scale Taiwanese export-oriented enterprises attempting to 
internationalise as a result of rising costs and competition on the island.19
 
In South 
                                                        
Sanctions Against South Africa, UNESCO House, Paris - first findings on trade embargo.  
15 Ovendon & Cole (1989)  
 
16 Garner (1994, p. 7) could not determine if this was a result of Taiwanese foreign investment in the homeland 
RIDP zones.  
17 MacDonald & MacDonald (1964) define this as a “movement in which prospective migrants learn of 
opportunities, are provided with transportation, and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by 
means of primary social relationships with previous migrants.”  
18 Van der Watt & Visser (2008)  
19 Pickles & Woods (1989, p. 510) 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Africa, the Taiwanese foreign investors offered one of the only opportunities for 
black homelands to attract new industries to their zones.20Seeking out Taiwanese 
investment (and immigration), successive marketing campaigns and trade missions 
were sent to Taiwan and Hong Kong in an attempt to attract capital to these RIDP 
zones. In doing so, South Africa revised its immigration laws relating to residence 
permits and multiple-entry visas for Taiwanese. The changes were aimed primarily 
at facilitating Taiwanese investment in the Republic.21 
 
Demonstrating the immigration trend, Figure 7 in Appendix C graphically plots the 
waves of Taiwanese migrants to South Africa against the important diplomatic, 
political and industrial events. Three migration spikes corresponding to the 
recruitment drives and political events can be observed. The first wave (A) followed 
trade missions and changes by the KwaZulu-Natal Finance Corporation and Transkei 
Development Corporation (1978 - 1980), expediting visa registrations for Taiwanese 
enterprises. These were designed to “welcome Taiwanese industrialists and build 
networks of firm collaboration between the Development Corporation and foreign 
investors.”22  
 
The second wave arrived after the announcement of the Good Hope RIDP incentives 
(B), which saw a deliberate effort to increase subsidies and attract foreign investment. 
The third and final large wave (C) followed the political changes in the Orange Free 
State province, namely the repeal of Act XXXIII, which had prevented Chinese from 
settling in the province. A marked decline in immigration (D) is seen from 1990 as 
RIDP subsidies were removed in 1992 and South Africa transitioned towards 
democracy in 1994. The Taiwanese population also declined due to emigration. 
Whether the termination of the incentives or diplomatic links account for this is 
debatable.23  
 
Although social acceptance among white South Africans towards the growing ethnic 
Chinese adapted during the1980s, a deep racial divide in business persisted.24 As a 
result “boundaries and borders, both real and metaphorical, related to various 
Chinese communities in southern Africa”25 Park (2008) explains that because of their 
small numbers and variations in categorising Chinese, bureaucrats were often at a 
loss as to what to do with the few Chinese they encountered.26  
                                                        
20 Pickles & Woods (1989, p. 515) explains that virtually all of the investments were in the homelands.  
21 Pickles & Woods (1989, p. 513)  
22 The Developer, 1979, issue 2, Mthata Archives.  
23 The 2001 census found that the population was estimated to be 10,000 in 2012.  
24 Park (2008, p. 124)  
25 Park (2010, p. 457)  
26 Park (2008, p. 125) notes how “second and third generation Chinese South Africans attested to the confusion 
in the day-to-day implementation of apartheid laws affecting them.” 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Tensions also formed between the Chinese South Africans and the newly arrived 
Taiwanese, 27  while relations with the white business community remained limited 
to urban areas. Van der Watt and Visser (2008) found that the Chinese were 
commonly perceived to be a threat to the white small businessmen, and legal 
obstacles in the form of permits and restrictions were regularly put in their way. This 
was not a new impediment, as the original Chinese (Cantonese) and later Taiwanese 
communities in South Africa faced a long history of institutionalised discrimination. 
As a result, Taiwanese immigrants resorted to their existing transnational networks, 
which were important for trade and investment.28  
 
3 Data and methodology 
 
Compiling estimates from statistical measures in South Africa during this time was 
fraught with challenges of data availability and consistency in reporting. The changes 
to bilateral trade and foreign investment were shrouded in secrecy during sanctions. 
Once again Geldenhuys (1991) explained how South Africa’s financial and statistical 
agencies stopped publishing trade statistics in 1986, remarking that “only a 
geographical breakdown of South Africa’s international trade has been available for 
world zones, namely Africa, Europe, Americas, Asia and Oceania”.29 To overcome 
these challenges, I have compiled a new dataset of South Africa’s trade with it’s 
largest traditional OECD partner from 1975, and then used new archival sources to 
reconstruct migration patterns.  
 
3.1 Trade data  
 
The restrictions on trade data resulted in a skewed, but hidden view of South Africa’s 
bilateral trade relationships. Annemarie van der Walt, the head of archival trade 
statistics at the South African Revenue Services (SARS),30 noted in written 
communication, “prior to 1992 all statistical data held by this institution referring to 
trade between Chinese Taipei and South Africa is likely to be unreliable at best”.31 
The reasons for this scarcity are manifold. Certain scholars have inferred that the 
‘under-reporting’ was done in order to protect both the trading partner who sought to 
circumvent sanctions, or as a direct act of data secrecy by the Nationalist Government 
who were under severe external funding pressure.32 For example Kaempfer, Lehman 
                                                        
27 Park (2010, p. 457 - 458)  
28 Hart (1996, p. 14) also demonstrated how the “original investors were joined by small, new firms established 
by their own former technicians [...] who began to subcontract to their former firms. Some of the older firms 
supplied credit to the new firms.”  
29 Geldenhuys (1991, p. 267)  
30 Institution responsible for recording bilateral trade for the purpose of tax collection.  
31 Per email communication dated 11/04/2013.  
32 See Ovendon & Cole (1989) for a synopsis on how SA circumvented sanctions. 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and Lowenberg (1987) explained that much of the trade history has been 
underreported with the “South African government permitting firms to withhold 
sensitive data from their financial reports [...] indicating that it will not enforce 
international trade practices, such as labelling the origin of goods.”33 Furthermore, 
much of the data has been overlooked due to restricted access and the sheer labour 
intensity of reconstructing bilateral trade series from diffuse archival documents.  
 
Using declassified trade statistics and a triangulation of two further published 
sources, this paper assembles a new, more complete bilateral trade data series for 
each of the twenty three reported Standard Industrial Classifications (SIC). The bulk 
of the new data (1984 - 1992) was transcribed from new archival sources. From 1975 
until 1985 the bilateral data is compiled using the official international trade statistics 
series.34 These official records captured trade between South Africa and all its trading 
partners. The trade data was segmented according the Sections of the Harmonised 
System for 23 product categories.35
 
Between 1986 and 1992 the Department of Trade 
stopped publishing trade statistics at the country level altogether. Garner (1994) 
noted that researchers had to turn to other sources as a result of a data embargo, and 
doubted the accuracy of any publicly available data. This limitation has impacted 
migration and trade research, as it was during these rigid years of sanctions that 
growth in Taiwanese trade could have accounted for the reorientation. To estimate 
the years 1986 - 1992, Garner used an alternative series. These sources included 
revised estimates from the UN, IMF and OECD adjusting it with data in the Sanction 
Report produced by Hanlon and Omond (1987). However Garner noted that the IMF 
Direction of Trade Statistics were “a misleading set of figures on partner countries 
with South Africa. [...] They were calculated by scaling up or down figures from the 
base year in 1985 across all countries by a uniform percentage”36
 
Nonetheless, the 
IMF’s interpolated Direction of Trade Statistics database was useful as it recorded 
aggregate regional data from where a baseline for the new data could be established 
and contrasted.  
 
To overcome the access limitations and data constraints imposed during the years of 
sanctions, I have recreated the bilateral trade series with additional, declassified trade 
statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry. These were reported in annual 
                                                        
33 Kaempfer, Lehman & Lowenberg (1987, p. 276)  
34 Hardcopy trade statistics were digitised from original archival records held at the National Treasury, the 
National Archive in Pretoria and the University of Cape Town government publications library.  
35 The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) is a system for classifying industries by a four-digit code. South 
Africa used this system until 1988, after which it shifted to the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding 
System, also known as the Harmonised System (HS) of tariff nomenclature developed and maintained by the 
World Customs Organisation (WCO). SIC codes have been mapped to HS codes using the standard 4 digit 
methodology to keep consistency across all years.  
36 Garner (1994, p. ii) 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returns held at the Parliamentary Library in Cape Town. Although these statistics 
should therefore have created a complete series, I nevertheless found it necessary to 
validate their accuracy. As such these are further supplemented with regional and 
national estimates reported in Garner to compare the official reports with IMF partner 
country data and South African data. Trade data from 1992 until 1995 was obtained 
from the South African Revenue Services (SARS) balance of trade database.37
 
This 
contained monthly and annual trade flows with all South Africa’s trading partners. 
1995 is chosen as the end date for the study, as it is 4 years after the US 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act38
 
was repealed and EU Sanctions39
 
were lifted. 
This provides sufficient post sanctions data to examine whether the Taiwanese 
diversification in exports was merely a reaction to isolationisms or a permanent 
feature of the export trade partnership.40 
 
3.2 Migration data  
 
In addition to trade data limitations, recent migration studies have also suffered from 
data availability. For example Stapleton (2015) explained how empirical research 
into migration in South Africa is conspicuous in its absence. Empirical migration 
studies require longitudinal data that can track individuals across time. Therefore data 
limitations, especially during late apartheid have restricted any migration studies.  
 
The Department of Internal Affairs recorded the total number of permanent residents 
entering and leaving the country each month. However South Africa’s data collection 
was further clouded by racial restrictions on migration and the balkanisation of 
homelands, which collected their own statistics. In the aggregated national statistics, 
only developed countries were recorded, while those in Africa and Asia, apart from 
Japan, were simply grouped at the regional level. As such, official Department of 
Internal Affairs migration statistics could not be used to quantify Taiwanese 
immigration. In fact Taiwanese immigration was never recorded in the Internal 
Affairs statistics, which was curious, as my research shows that they were the largest 
cohort of immigrants during the 1980 - 1990 period (highlighted in Appendix C, 
Figure 5 on page 29).41
  
 
Conservative estimates of Taiwanese migration and population series were 
                                                        
37 Head of Data Archives, Annemarie van der Walt, SARS email  
38 1st of July, 1991  
39 15th of April, 1991  
40 The sample of bilateral trade data represents 68% of South Africa’s total 1975 bilateral trade. By 1995 the 
selected countries had declined to 59% of South Africa’s total foreign trade but still represents a significant 
sample over the 20 years of analysis and is therefore sufficient for purpose of my trade and migration study.  
41 Although South Africa had a high level of sub-Saharan migration to the mines (i.e. Mozambique, Malawi 
and Lesotho) these are excluded from my statement. These were circular migratory patterns with no permanent 
settlement in South Africa.  
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assembled from the Board for the Decentralisation business license applications 
(National Archive, Pretoria, RSA).42
 
Using the business license applications, Table 
1 below shows the total number of immigrants in each of the years. However the 
exact quantum of Taiwanese citizens residing in South Africa is difficult to gauge 
and remains contentious. Examination of official emigration and immigration 
statistics is challenging as the South African government only recorded race “Asian” 
for all immigrants from Asia between 1950 and 1990. A total of 100,000 Taiwanese 
individuals were estimated to have immigrated and emigrated between the two 
countries. However Grimm et al. (2014) noted that at the height of this relationship, 
50,000 Taiwanese people resided permanently in South Africa. This estimation 
proves the most accurate and is corroborated by similar accounts as no official RSA 
statistics have been located to the full extent of Taiwanese migration.  
 
The upper bound of Taiwanese immigration estimated by Grimm et al. is useful, 
however an annual migration series is required for this study. To gain a measure of 
the annual inbound flow of Taiwanese immigrants I therefore had to turn to the Board 
for the Decentralisation of Industries (BDI) as a proxy, which granted business 
license applications. Administering the 8 development regions, the BDI was the 
overarching statutory body. The BDI recorded the country of origin and the number 
of immigrants that were accompanying the business licence application which are 
tabulated below.  
 
Between 1980 and 1991, a total of 11,036 business licenses were granted across all 
eight of the RIDP zones. Further contextualising the Taiwanese immigration, I have 
also collected the total European immigration statistics from South Africa’s former 
direct and indirect colonial partners as a benchmark. Although these are not 
necessary to the analysis, they are useful to contextualise the long-term effect of trade 
networks, market preferences and migration in South Africa.43 Appendix C Figure 5 
tabulates total European immigration as a proxy for direct and indirect colonial trade 
ties against which to measure the Taiwanese case study.  
 
  
                                                        
42 1,036 business licenses were granted to ROC companies over the period, however it appears that only 30% 
of those licenses were taken-up. This is consistent with the totals found by Pickles and Wood (1989) for the 
earlier period where they found only 91 of the 300 business licenses were taken up.  
 
43 Figure 5 in Appendix C shows annual European flows.  
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Table 1: RIDP Business License Application (1980 - 1991) for the whole RIDP 
project number Taiwanese applicants (LHS).  
 
 
Note: The results show the difference between approved and established. (RHD) and the total number 
Taiwanese applicants (LHS). The results show the difference between approved and established. 
 
Source:  Board for the Decentralisation, business license applications (National 
Archive, Pretoria, RSA).  
 
3.3 Methodology 
 
The migrant-trade effect examines the degree to which exports shift from 
homogeneous to differentiated products following the inflow of migrants. Promoting 
bilateral trade, the effect operates through two channels. Firstly migrants reduce 
information costs, as the mechanism of matching and referral services is more 
important for differentiated exports such as manufactured goods, which require the 
provision of information regarding trading opportunities. Secondly, it improves 
contracting conditions as migrant networks had an impact on trade through 
community enforcement or sanctions that deterred opportunistic behaviour, and 
encouraged co-operation. This increased the potential for host countries with larger 
migrant populations to diversify and increase trade. Therefore could Taiwanese 
migrants have increased South Africa’s export trade by means of matching sellers 
and improving contracting and thus making it more competitive?  
 
Rauch and Casella (2001) first proposed this empirical trade-flow model to show 
how a network, formed by the overseas Chinese population, had a major trade-
!"24"!"
"
Business'License'Applications'
Business'
Licenses'
Total'
Approved'
Established'
!No!!!!!!!!!!!!%!
ROC'
Approved'
Established'
!!!No'''''''''''%'
Residence'
Permits'
" " " " " " " "
1980" 680" 247" 36%" 27" 11" 40%" 1,387"
1981" 798" 355" 44%" 31" 14" 45%" 4,067"
1982/1983" 777" 384" 49%" 27" 20" 74%" 1,890"
1983/1984" 1,190" 578" 48%" 17" 14" 82%" 3,876"
1984/1985" 1,216" 452" 37%" 29" 21" 72%" 278"
1985/1986" 1,243" NA" 0" 27" 22" 81%" 490"
1986/1987" 1,027" NA" 0" 51" 42" 82%" 7,907"
1987/1988" 1,080" NA" 0" 55" 51" 92%" 900"
1988/1989" 1,042" NA" 0" 78" 63" 80%" 876"
1989/1990" 893" NA" 0" 31" 24" 77%" 20"
1990/1991" 1,090" 470" 43%" 19" 14" 73%" 657"
" " " " " " " "
TOTAL' 1,1036' 4,181' 37%' 382' 296' 78%' 23,137'
'
TABLE' 2:'RIDP"Business"License"Application"(1980"–"1991)"for"the"whole"RIDP"project"(RHD)"and"the"total"
number"Taiwa ese"applicants"(LHS)."The"results"show"the"difference"betw "ap roved"and"established."""
SOURCE:"Board"for"the"Decentralisation,"business"license"applications"(National"Archive,"Pretoria,"RSA).""
"
"
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creating effect. Informal co-ethnic networks formed by migrants “like the Chinese 
trading network [...] and formal business networks such as the Japanese keiretsu have 
a significant impact on the volume of trade across borders.”44 These networks had an 
economically positive impact on bilateral trade in differentiated rather than 
homogeneous products.45  
 
Exploiting my new, more complete trade series, the following analysis examines 
three discrete elements of the changes to differentiated and homogenous bilateral 
trade with Asia, following Taiwanese migration.  
 
1. First it quantifies the macro trends from1975, highlighting regional and country 
shifts, which underscored South Africa’s trade partnerships in the 1980s. This 
provides the basis against which to measure OECD exports vis-à-vis Taiwanese.  
2. Second it quantifies bilateral trade with Taiwan. Using the intensive and extensive 
margin of trade provides the basis for analysing the substitution effects during 
sanctions.  
3. Finally, using the SIC codes, it categorises the change in South Africa’s export 
trade with Taiwan, examining the degree to which exports shifted from 
homogeneous to differentiated products.  
 
Each of these analysis questions build on one another. The last section then 
qualitatively discusses whether the emergence of trade networks account for any 
observed changes to Taiwanese exports.  
 
4 Analysis 
 
4.1 Macro trends  
 
In 1975, South Africa was among the leading 25 trading nations in the west.46 Direct 
colonial ties with Britain, and indirect OECD ties with Germany, France and the 
United States accounted for much of the export trade. Imports from Germany, the 
US, Japan and Britain accounted for 63 % of merchandise purchases in 1975, with 
the remainder widely and thinly spread. As such, South Africa’s foreign trade has 
been concentrated with the leading OECD states. We would therefore expect these 
to persist in the export data going into the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
                                                        
44 Rauch & Casella (2001, p. 7)  
45 Rauch & Trindade (2002) find that for trade between countries with ethnic Chinese population shares at the 
levels prevailing in Southeast Asia, the smallest estimated average increase in bilateral trade in differentiated 
products attributable to ethnic Chinese networks is nearly 60 %.” 
46 Assuming South Africa could be considered a member of the western block (Geldenhuys, 1991, p. 345)  
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It is important to note that trends in South Africa’s exports emphasise the country’s 
largest export earner, namely gold (Table 2). Exports were highly sensitive to 
changes in the price and production of gold. Over the 1970s and into the 1980s, the 
quantity of gold produced and exported declined. However in the 1980s, a sharp 
increase to $800 an ounce witnessed a windfall in the exports.  
 
Jones and Inggs (1994) notes how non-gold mineral exports increased in the 1970s 
with the development of new mines and transport infrastructure. This is clearly 
observed in Table 2. Furthermore non-gold minerals began to outstrip gold exports 
in 1976, superseding its importance, and thus diversifying exports further. This 
market diversification reduced South Africa’s vulnerability to economic sanctions. 
For example, I found that that South Africa’s largest mineral market (Japan) absorbed 
only 17.8 % of South Africa’s mineral exports. Geldenhuys (1991) notes that this 
partly explains why sanctions were not a crippling blow to the economy when Japan, 
and then the US, imposed import bans on South African commodities. A noticeable 
decline of trade was observed in exports to Britain. In 1984, Britain had dropped to 
3rd place47 with the US and Japan surpassing UK exports.  
 
Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community partly explains this change, 
as South Africa no longer enjoyed preferential access as a former Commonwealth 
member. The US’s imports from South Africa expanded strongly just before 
sanctions were imposed. However it appears that Japan’s decline in export trade with 
South Africa wasn’t as pronounced as prior research from Garner (1994) had 
speculated. Indeed there was a decline after 1985, but exports remained stable during 
the sanctions period. This would give credence to Geldenhuys (1991) who found that 
a “cloak of official secrecy” surrounded exports when Japan had not included 
“massive gold imports in their officially released figure”.48 
 
  
                                                        
47 4th place if Switzerland had been included in the sample, but as they mostly received gold exports (97 %), it 
was necessary to exclude the Swiss from the sample-country set.  
48 Geldenhuys (1991, p. 349)  
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Table 2: Gold, Mineral and All Other Exports expressed as a Percentage of 
Total Exports for the Sample Group (1975 - 2000). 
 
 
 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, Department of Trade and Industry, 
Garner (1994), IMD direction of trade statistics (1986 -1990). South African 
Revenue Services (1991 - 1995).  
 
In 1975, South Africa’s annual exports to Taiwan barely reached $100 million. By 
1984, South Africa’s non-traditional Asian markets (Taiwan and Hong Kong) were 
becoming increasingly important for her exports. Figure 1 below clearly confirms the 
Garner (1994) theory that Taiwan was the fastest growing trade partner and can now 
be accurately estimated. It is against this backdrop that changes to Taiwanese trade 
is next explored.  
 
4.2 Bilateral trade with Taiwan  
 
While export trade diminished with South Africa’s traditional partners, bilateral trade 
with Taiwan increased. In this section I therefore examine how exports changed by 
quantifying the extensive margin (volume over time) and the intensive margin 
(change in diversity). The growth in value (extensive margin), and the change in 
diversity (intensive margin) could be emblematic of greater connections and deeper 
markets as result of immigration. Although not causal, migration to South Africa 
highlights the potential relationship between the extensive and intensive margins.  
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Figure 1: Percentage Change in Exports to Sample Countries, Nominal US $ 
(1975 - 1995) 
 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, Department of Trade and Industry, 
Garner (1994), IMD direction of trade statistics (1986 -1990). South African 
Revenue Services (1991 - 1995).  
 
The volume of trade with Taiwan could have also have been skewed by the growth 
in mineral exports and the changing US $ price of gold. However, to examine the 
possibility that this shift in trade occurred at both the extensive and intensive margin 
and not just because of minerals exports, the data is disaggregated into five main 
groups using the SIC code. These categories include Agriculture and Foods, 
Minerals, Consumers Goods, Capital Goods and Processed Chemicals. Confirming 
the hypothesis, Figure 2 below demonstrates the shift in export trade with South 
Africa, growing in all sectors. Before discussing the possible causes for these changes 
in the next section, two trends relating to the margin of trade can be identified. Firstly, 
there was continuous growth in exports of Minerals,49 accelerating between 1986 - 
1988, and again in 1990. This is representative of the extensive margin, i.e. where 
trade between countries already exists, we would expect this to continue and grow 
overtime.50  
                                                        
49 Mineral SIC Grouping: 5, 14 & 15 - See Appendix E, Table 7 for a detailed SIC description.  
50 Felbermayr & Kohler (2004) 
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Figure 2: Exports to Taiwan, grouped by SIC codes in five primary categories 
 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, Department of Trade and Industry, 
Garner (1994), IMD direction of trade statistics (1986 -1990). South African 
Revenue Services (1991 - 1995).  
 
Taiwan, prior to 1975, had traditionally traded minerals and agricultural products in 
a limited quantity. We thus observe the expansion of these export products along an 
extensive margin in the trade data. However, there are sizeable shifts in the demand 
for mineral exports in the periods identified above. This may suggest that other 
factors could account for these shifts such as “sanction busting”51 or re-exporting52 
of resources via Taiwan. Although Taiwanese exports of minerals only represented 
a small percentage of total exports, the shift is sizeable. This can also be seen in 
conjunction with changes to Hong Kong exports of minerals, which could therefore 
support a reorientation towards Asian exports via Taiwan during sanctions.  
 
The second trend is a very pronounced growth in Consumer Goods53, and finally the 
                                                        
51 Naylor (1999) explains how various schemes to skirt South African embargoes were deployed by strategic 
allies. 
52 Geldenhuys (1991, p. 353) 
53 Consumer SIC Grouping: 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 & 13 - See Appendix E, Table 7 for a detailed description.  
$0##
$100,000,000##
$200,000,000##
$300,000,000##
$400,000,000##
$500,000,000##
$600,000,000##
$700,000,000##
19
75
#
19
76
#
19
77
#
19
78
#
19
79
#
19
80
#
19
81
#
19
82
#
19
83
#
19
84
#
19
85
#
19
86
#
19
87
#
19
88
#
19
89
#
19
90
#
19
91
#
19
92
#
19
93
#
19
94
#
19
95
#
Ex
p
o
rt
s#
in
#N
o
m
in
al
#U
S#
$
#
Angriculture##&#Food# Minerals# Consumer#Goods# Capital#Goods# Processed#Chemicals#
 J.STUD.ECON.ECONOMETRICS, 2018, 42(2) 119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
increase in Capital Goods, bounded between the sanction years of 1985 and 1991.54 
Felbermayr and Kohler (2004) notes that when a new trade partnership is newly 
formed, growth in the diversity and value of exports may accompany the newly 
established relationship. It is the growth in this diversification of trade (i.e. 
differentiated Consumer Goods and Capital Goods, as opposed to reference priced 
Minerals sold on organised markets) that is of particular interest. As Figure 2 clearly 
demonstrates, South Africa had very little diversified Consumer or Capital Goods 
exports to Taiwan prior to 1980. Interestingly, coinciding with sanctions, only after 
the migration of the Taiwanese to the RIDP zones in the 1980s, growth in these 
industries are observed in the trade data.  
 
4.3 Trade diversification  
 
To quantify this second (extensive) impact I have grouped exports into two categories 
by matching each Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System to a 
product category: (1) differentiated goods and (2) reference-price, homogenous 
goods.55  
 
For the purpose of this study, I will focus on the export side of the balance of trade 
as it is the diversification from homogenous to heterogeneous that is of particular 
interest.56 The percentage increases in export trade is also reported against OECD 
ties. These are included to provide a baseline against which the growth in a small 
Taiwanese population can be compared, and are not intended to be causal. A 
reference price is defined as a price that is quoted without mentioning a brand name 
or other producer identification. The reason to distinguish between differentiated 
goods and homogenous goods is that commodities, traded on organised exchanges, 
behave differently from differentiated goods. Commodities possess reference prices 
in which traders can see the price differential between two countries’ markets. 
However, differentiated goods carry no reference price and therefore may hold an 
information premium conveyed by the possible existence of Taiwanese production 
networks in South Africa. Because of South Africa’s different economic, cultural and 
political environment, this information premium is expected to be more 
advantageous for differentiated products, and we may then find a positive effect for 
trade in differentiated goods between RSA and ROC. It is in such a case, that the 
Taiwanese migrants could have engaged in a market creation for their RIDP factory 
production, accounting for this growth.  
 
These baseline results in Table 3 highlight the extent to which most of South African 
                                                        
54 Capital SIC Grouping: 17, 18, 19, 22 & 23 - See Appendix E, Table 7 for a detailed description. 
55 According to the Rauch & Trindade (2002) classification of homogenous to heterogeneous exports.  
56 This is detailed in the Discussion Section 5. 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differentiated trade (43.7 %) in 1975 was dominated by its former OECD trade and 
investment partners. However, if jewellery and precious stones are removed from the 
differentiated data, this falls to 31 % in 1975 and 19 % in 1990.57  
 
Table 3: Heterogeneous and Homogenous Exports for Taiwan and to the 
traditional OECD trading links (UK, US, Germany, Japan and France) 
 
 
Note: Gold is excluded from homogenous commodities as exports were highly sensitive to changes in the price 
and were stockpiled, skewing the analysis. 
 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, Department of Trade and Industry, 
Garner (1994), IMF direction of trade (1986 -1990). South African Revenue Services 
(1991 - 1995).  
 
In 1975, Taiwan received 1.6 % of South Africa’s total exports, of which 1 % were 
reference-price homogenous goods, such as coal and maize. While 0.6 % was 
considered differentiated, of which approximately 50 % were waxes and edible oils, 
and 20 % were beverages or spirits. Given that South Africa had both a large 
agricultural, wine and spirit sector, we would expect this to have dominated early 
differentiated exports to Taiwan, which did not enjoy the same endowments. 
However the extent to which these could be considered ‘information-intensive’ and 
therefore preference sensitive is debatable as wines or waxes could easily be 
                                                        
57 This provides for a more conservative estimate of trade and was not removed or differentiated by  
Edwards & Lawrence (2008), and is therefore a weakness of their study.  
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such"Taiwanese"trade"may"have"been"a"conduit"through"which"countries"like"Japan"
accessed"their"supply"chains"located"in"South"Africa."This"was"particularly"observed"
in"the"automotive"sector"in"which"Toyota,"GM"and"Ford"had"heavily"invested"in"both"
South"Africa"and"Taiwan.""
"
"
PERCENTAGE)EXPORT)TRADE))
! !
%!Population!in!
South!Africa!
Homogenous!
Products!
Differentiated!
Products!
1975!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA'
0.01%' 1.02%' 0.60%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries'''
2.12%' 10.86%' 43.7%'
1980!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA'
0.03%' 1.06%' 0.69%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries'''
1.95%' 6.43%' 23.69%'
1985!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA'
0.8%' 0.86%' 0.90%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries'''
1.96%' 5.49%' 17.5%'
1990!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA'
0.9%' 2.93%' 4.93%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries'''
1.82%' 7.4%' 24.98%'
1995!
Overseas'Chinese'
network'in'SA'
1.2%' 3.75%' 5.93%'
OECD'Trading'
Countries'''
1.68%' 5.98%" 26.38%"
)
TABLE)3:)Changes"to"percentage"of"Export"trade"attributable"to"Taiwanese"migrants"and"to"former"
business"and"migrants"colonial"ties."Direct"and"indirect"colonial"ties"are"grouped"as"UK,"US,"Germany"and"
France."
SOURCE:))Foreign"Trade"statistical"series"assembled"from"Foreign"Trade"Statistics"1975"!"1985,"with"
supplementary"statistics"from"the"Department"of"Trade"and"Industry,"Garner"(1994)"and"IMD"direction"
of"trade"statistics"(1986"!1990)."South"African"Revenue"Services"using"HS"codes"provided"the"years"1991"
–"1995."Estimates"of"Taiwanese"migration"and"population"series"assembled"from"the"Board"for"the"
Decentralization,"business"license"applications"(National"Archive,"Pretoria,"RSA)."Direct"and"indirect"
colonial"migration"assembled"from"the"Department"of"Internal"Affairs,"Annual"Reports,"The"National"
Archive,"Pretoria,"and"The"Government"Publications"Library,"University"of"Cape"Town"
"
"
"
Examining"the"above"hypothesis"GRAPH"7"below"further"disaggregates"the"
 J.STUD.ECON.ECONOMETRICS, 2018, 42(2) 121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
substituted. If we move further through the time period, the trade patterns changed 
in favour of Taiwanese information-intensive exports such as electronics, textiles, 
footwear and specialist chemicals. Moreover, of particular significance is how 
differentiated trade in traditional markets rapidly declined in the intervening years of 
sanction (1980 - 1985). However, a key finding from the new data shows that during 
this tumultuous timeframe, the share of total differentiated products in South Africa’s 
exports escalated from 0.9 % to 4.93 % in favour of Taiwan.58 
 
Although small in total differentiated exports, this shift is a noticeable increase. 
Geldenhuys (1991) notes how by 1984, non-traditional market diversification 
accounted for roughly a third of South African exports. After 1985, Taiwan appears 
to outstrip the growth of all other partners, “which can hardly be coincidence that 
several of the countries have also, to varying degrees experienced international 
ostracism.”59 
 
A further explanation for this change could have been sanction busting, encouraged 
by the complementary nature of the South Africa and East Asian economies. Taiwan 
and to some extent Hong Kong were becoming re-exporters, through which other 
Asian nations were receiving both differentiated and homogenous South African 
exports. Pickles and Woods (1989) mentioned that Taiwan could be “a possible 
conduit for South African exports in the event of comprehensive sanctions.”60
 
While 
Garner (1994) had suggested that during these years, the risk of doing business in 
South Africa outweighed the benefits of accessing the most industrialised African 
country. Taiwanese trade may have been a conduit through which countries like 
Japan accessed their supply chains located in South Africa. This may have particular 
reference to the automotive sector in which Toyota, GM and Ford had heavily 
invested in both South Africa and Taiwan. The coming sections will discuss the 
formation of supply-chain linkages further.  
 
5 Trade and migration 
 
South-east Asia has strong ethnic business networks as part of their embedded social 
capital. The links between those in East and South-east Asia have been discussed 
extensively in the literature, with most attention being given to the Chinese business 
networks that knit together the export manufacturing success stories in Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and parts of South-east Asia.61Therefore, within an integrated 
RIDP production network, co-ethnic Taiwanese suppliers and exporters could be 
                                                        
58 Traditional markets were UK, US, Germany & France.  
59 Geldenhuys (1991, p. 353)  
60 Pickles & Woods (1989, p. 512)  
61 Weidenbaum & Hughes (1996)  
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regarded as part of a broader diaspora’s social capital embedded in South Africa. 
Recent scholarship has examined how these networks have also spread from Asia62
 
to Europe,63
 
the US64
 
and now into Africa.65 
 
Kotkin (1993) stated that “Chinese entrepreneurs remain in essence, arbitrageurs, 
their widespread dispersion a critical means of identifying prime business 
opportunities.”66
 
The South African hypothesis is therefore neatly summarised by 
Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996) who noted that; 
 
 
“The members of the bamboo network operate in the interstices of 
the trading world. They make components, manufacture for others, 
and perform sub-assembly work. They are also heavily involved in 
wholesaling, financing, sourcing, and transporting. The leading 
businessmen know each other personally and do deals together, with 
information spreading through an informal network rather than 
through more conventional channels”67 
 
I have further disaggregated the export industries into industrial sectors in which 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs were heavily invested, exploring how Taiwanese investors 
contributed to growth of differentiated exports. Of particular interest to this paper is 
the way that networks affect the relationship between migration and trade when the 
two countries have been internationally isolated. With a further variable, namely an 
annual reconstruction of Taiwanese migration to the homeland RIDP zones, I will 
also examine qualitative archival accounts, questioning to what extent these migrant 
investors, “using their vast trading networks”,68
 
were able to diversify export trade 
from South Africa to Taiwan.  
 
Migrants can provide an information bridge between two dense networks: in this 
case, suppliers in South Africa and customers’ demands in established export markets 
such as Taiwan, Asia or Europe. Taiwanese migrants possessed economic, cultural 
and institutional knowledge about both the home (Asian) and the host markets 
(Southern Africa), in which they were able to mediate exchange, thus increasing trade 
above what it would be in the absence of their migration. Although these two nations 
may have been a special case, it could be argued that without migration neither would 
have traded to a greater degree.  
                                                        
62 Rauch & Trindade (2002)  
63 Hsu & Saxenian (2000)  
64 Head, Ries & Swenson (1995)  
65 Bräutigam (2003)  
66 Kotkin (1993, p. 17)  
67 Weidenbaum & Hughes (1996, p. 198) 
68 Minister K.T. Li, 1980 newspaper article in the New China Times (01/03/1980).  
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Seminal work from Gould (1994) demonstrates how immigrants’ associations to 
their home country were able to foster bilateral trade linkages. These ties include 
knowledge of home-country markets, language, preferences, and business contacts 
that have the potential to decrease trading transaction costs, and increase market 
knowledge. This is evident in the archival accounts discussed below (5.2). The 
networks themselves are woven together with strands of information, shared 
contacts, sometimes finance (credit or investment), and a degree of trust, frequently 
backed up by group-based sanctions. If we conceptualise Taiwanese 
entrepreneurship in South Africa as “embedded in networks of continuing social 
relations”69
 
then social capital and networks are a central tenet in how bilateral trade 
expanded. The benefits derived from belonging to an ethnic-specific group and 
having social ties via former employment or managerial posts facilitated trade.  
 
South Africa was in upheaval in the 1980s. Institutionalised racism precluded 
migrant Taiwanese from credit markets or domestic supply chains, while sanctions 
prevented access to large export markets in Europe or North America. Greif (1994) 
and Dunlevy (2006) demonstrate how private order networks substitute for 
weakening political institutions. As such early migrants had to form interconnected 
supply chains in South Africa that were an extension of customers in Taiwan with 
whom they had a relationship that could transcend the institutionalised apartheid 
risks.  
 
In 1981 the Taiwanese entrepreneurs in South Africa initiated their first Chamber of 
Commerce (later the African Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce or ATCC) to 
facilitate trade and interaction between the communities. Appointing Taiwanese 
agents in Taipei, the homeland development corporations also facilitated further 
ROC investment in the RIDP. Hart and Todes (1997) observed that “the 
predominance of Taiwanese investment in the 1980s was not just a quirk of apartheid 
subsidies and diplomatic ties between pariah states, but [...] organised around familial 
and network forms of production.”70 To explore how industries in which Taiwanese 
investors contributed to growth of network forms of production.” The formation of 
network migration and investment within the RIDP zones will be discussed next.  
 
5.1 Changes to Taiwanese exports  
 
The recurring findings in the literature emphasise how Taiwanese entrepreneurs 
provided foreign market information to both customers and supply chains in Asia, 
spurring exports in specific sectors. To explore the possibility of RIDP investors 
contributing to the growth of differentiated exports, I disaggregate the export 
                                                        
69 Gould (1994, p. 365) 
70 Hart & Todes (1997, p. 36)  
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industries into the industrial sectors in which the Taiwanese entrepreneurs operated. 
Table 4 below summarises the percentage investment in each manufacturing sector 
during the RIDP zones between 1978 - 1992. Although any growth in exports cannot 
be directly linked to these investors, I merely seek to observe the possibility of a pro-
trade effect of RIDP investment and exports. The possibility that Taiwanese investors 
may have developed as part of an integrated supply network will then be discussed 
in the following section. 
 
Table 4: Percentage Taiwanese Investment in each RIDP Manufacturing Sector 
(1978 - 1992).  
 
 
 
Source: Board for the Decentralisation of Industry. National Archive, Pretoria, South 
Africa. sample as they skew the results due to the high value but low volume 
 
Examining the sectors in which the Taiwanese invested and the export growth of 
differentiated goods is particularly enlightening. For example 10 % of the Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs were invested in clothing and knitwear industries. While in 1975, 
South Africa exported almost none of these products (0.03 %), by 1990, 17.45 % of 
the exports were from this sector. The same is observed in transport equipment (1.6 
% in 1975) as Taiwanese firms in the RIDP zones started producing OEM equipment 
for vehicle manufacturers. Appendix F, Table 5 details all sectors and exports to 
Taiwan over the period. Given the possible implication of Taiwanese migration to 
South Africa measured in the bilateral trade data, the next section will discuss to what 
extent qualitative accounts provide additional evidence for the observed shift in trade.  
 
 
  
!"46"!"
5.1 CHANGES+TO+TAIWANESE+EXPORTS+
"
To"explore"how"industries"in"which"Taiwanese"investors"contributed"to"growth"of"
differentiated" exports," I" have" further" disaggregated" the" export" industries" into"
industrial"sectors"in"which"Taiwanese"entrepreneurs"were"heavily"invested.75""
+
TABLE"4"below"summarizes"the"percentage"investment"in"each"manufacturing"
sector"during"the"RIDP"from"1978"–"1992."The"results"highlighted"in"each"of"the"
graphs"below"suggest"a"noticeable"pattern"which"follows"after"years"of"greater"
investment"and"migration76."Hence"I"graphically"observe"that"the"pro!trade"effect"of"
Taiwanese"immigrants"is"possibility"greatest"for"differentiated"products"in"which"
they"were"invested,"as"opposed"to"goods"sold"on"organised"markets."This"recurring"
finding"in"the"literature"therefore"emphasizes"how"the"provision"of"foreign"market"
information"that"the"Taiwanese"entrepreneurs"provided"to"both"customers"and"
supply"chains"in"Asia"spurred"exports"in"specific"sectors."
"
Manufacturer+Category+
Percentage+of+Taiwanese+
Manufacturers+per+Sector+
Electrical"" 11.5%"
Plastics"and"Allied"Chemicals" 17.7%"
Clothing"and"Knitwear" 34%"
Raw"Textiles" 1.85%"
Footwear" 9.62%"
Packaging" 8.9%"
Metal"ware" 5.5%"
Furniture" 1.1%"
Jewellery" 2.59%"
Cosmetics"and"Toys" 1.1%"
Food" 1.1%"
Other" 4.81%"
+
TABLE+4:+Summary"of"manufacturing"industries"in"which"Taiwanese"firms"invested"(1978"–"1992)"
SOURCE:"Board"for"the"decentralisation"of"I dustry.""National"Archive.""
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
75"Jewelry"and"processed"previous"stones,"which"are"classified"as"differentiated"products"were"removed"from"the"
sample"as"they"skew"the"results"due"to"the"high"value"but"low"volume.""
76"Migration"demonstrated"in"GRAPH"6"
 J.STUD.ECON.ECONOMETRICS, 2018, 42(2) 125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Taiwanese networks in South Africa  
 
After the 1975 and 1978 bilateral investment and trade treaty (BITTs), the Taiwanese 
community were racially recognised as honorary whites, and offered the necessary 
private property protection under the law. The BITTs may have created “ethnic 
tolerance in which the Chinese could emerge in South Africa as a legitimate business 
group, free from official prejudice, protected by trade agreement, but they were 
suffused in social exclusion.”71
 
As such, this legal recognition did not extend to any 
social or commercial inclusion in the homelands or urban centres like those in 
Malaysia or Hong Kong, with large Chinese populations and Taiwanese investment.  
 
These entrepreneurs found themselves precluded from business affiliations or social 
linkages with white South Africans who dominated manufacturing and the business 
communities. Furthermore, due to the deep racial divisions, entrenched by the 
apartheid laws, both Chinese South Africans and Taiwanese migrants were excluded 
from many of the formal manufacturing and business organisations, and prohibited 
from formal credit markets. Lawrence Ting an early investor noted that:  
 
“The industrialists initially had problems with raising finance as they 
were not known to the South African banks, and by providing capital 
themselves were at the mercy of South Africa’s exchange-control 
regulations.”72
 
 
 
While Charles Liao, secretary of the Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce explained 
how the BITTs offered little protection:  
 
“[...] too many promises had been made to Chinese investors, and the 
governments of Taiwan and South Africa could have offered 
industrialists more support which meant we had to group together 
and find solutions”.73 
 
This was further compounded by language and cultural divides not only between the 
Taiwanese and South Africans, but also between the Chinese South Africans who in 
the main originated from Cantonese-speaking areas.74
 
Migrants to the homelands 
                                                        
71 Sono & South African Institute of Race Relations (1999, p. 36) 
72 Yap (1996, p. 421)  
73 Liao C (1991), Biennial conference speech at the Chinese Association on the “The Chinese investor in 
Southern Africa in retrospect and futurity”.  
74 Park (2010) notes that the early ancestors of today’s Chinese South Africans, were two distinct 
ethnic/language groups: the Cantonese and the Hakka (or Moiyeanese), both from Guangdong Province. These 
two groups settled in different parts of South Africa ,and did not mingle until well into the apartheid period 
when their small numbers and apartheid laws essentially forced them to coexist. South African Chinese did not 
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struggled to speak English, but had to contend with the rural settings of the RIDP 
zones where Africans also spoke little English. Charles Liao summarised the early 
cultural and operational challenges for new migrants in the 1970s:  
 
“From a densely populated Taiwan to the rural underdeveloped 
countryside of the border areas, the new settlers found themselves 
isolated, far from city amenities, without a place of worship and 
unable to purchase Chinese provisions [...] Insufficient research on 
their part often led to the establishment of factories producing goods 
for which there was no market in South Africa.”75 
 
Ironically, it appears that the naivety and lack of domestic market knowledge resulted 
in even greater stimulus to export their manufactured goods. The early excess 
production supply, especially of textiles, could not be sold into South Africa or 
Africa. As such, Taiwanese factories had to export their products back to warehouses 
in Asia.76
 
The formation of export supply chains became the base for exports as both 
sanctions and knowledge of customer preference in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan 
provided an easier route to market. This began to change as they quickly adapted, or 
new entrepreneurs joined the production network allowing for economies of scale 
producing higher-value finished goods. The KwaZulu Finance Corporation noted in 
their annual reports that many of the later entrants (after 1983) came to affiliate in 
domestic production networks:  
 
“The early Taiwanese migrants who had come to the country and our 
development zones had to rely on their existing home-market business 
relationships to export goods. Now that hundreds more have 
followed, we see greater volumes of finished goods being exported to 
markets, mostly in Asia, but also Europe and our African neighbours. 
The Taiwanese export not only their products, but customer loyalty 
as orders can be guaranteed from long-standing relationships 
established when the island was still referred to as Formosa.”77 
 
In later research Hart (1996) also found that the Taiwanese industrialists in 
Newcastle, a small town in KwaZulu, had to rely on their existing co-ethnic business 
networks, using it as an extension of factories operating in Asia. The Taiwanese 
immigrants leveraged their home country (ROC) links but also links to Hong Kong, 
which in turn provided export markets and enhanced bilateral trade flows between 
                                                        
identify at all with the Taiwanese and felt that they had given the Chinese a bad name. 
75 Van der Watt & Visser (2008, p. 122)  
76 Yap (1996, p. 475)  
77 KwaZulu Finance Corporation, trade publication (1985).  
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Asia and Southern Africa. This sentiment was echoed in the minutes of the KFC 
annual reports, which noted how:  
 
“Taiwanese migrants reduced both the cost and risk associated with 
immigrating to KwaZulu, increasing the net returns, and thus the 
probability of more migrating to our industrial zones in Newcastle, 
and Indizini. They bring not only production knowledge and capital, 
but customer knowledge and their loyalty.”78 
 
6 Conclusion  
 
With the 1975 signing of a trade deal, ethnic Chinese were officially recognised, 
following a diplomatic pivot towards Taiwan. This intensified period of investment, 
migration and bilateral trade would later develop into a large diaspora of Asian 
manufacturing firms on the African continent.79
 
Neither country had any formal 
diplomatic agreement a mere 10 years prior to this meeting. Yet in a few short years, 
they came to depend diplomatically on one another. But more importantly, as I have 
shown, they also became more economically engaged as migration grew. During 
sanctions, a clearly observable increase in export trade to Taiwan is measured in the 
new trade data assembled above.  
 
Prior to 1975 South Africa mostly traded with former western and OECD trade 
partners (73 % in 1975). However, the quantum of bilateral trade (and migration) 
after 1975 was classified or omitted by government agencies as a response to UN 
sanctions and punitive disinvestment by foreign firms. Relying on estimates, prior 
research has noted the methodological problems in assessing trade flows as a result 
of a data embargo, and doubted the accuracy of any publicly available trade statistics 
during sanctions. Assembling a new data series from declassified trade statistics 
demonstrates that the inflow of foreign investment and immigrants from Taiwan may 
have increased the potential for manufactured exports. Moreover, by disaggregating 
the extensive and intensive margin of trade, it is shown how South Africa not only 
increased its trade volume, but more importantly, increased the diversity of exports 
to Taiwan. When official bilateral trade data was once again published in 1994, 
Taiwan’s trade with South Africa was more diversified, and in some manufacturing 
sectors exceeded that of its former OECD trade partners. These findings offer a novel 
perspective on the rise of export manufacturing, and shows how migration to a small 
open economy such as South Africa could have a positive impact on trade.  
                                                        
78 KwaZulu Finance Corporation (1988) annual report, Government Publications, University of Cape Town.  
79 Although Chinese firms have begun investing directly in African countries, no evidence as measured by 
number of firms or total country employment suggests that the quantity or diversity has reached that of 
Taiwanese manufacturing firms in South Africa between 1975 and 1996.  
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Exploring the possibility of Taiwanese entrepreneurs in the RIDP zones increasing 
exports of differentiated goods in specific sectors demonstrated that both investments 
and exports increased in tandem. Although not causal, this suggests that Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs, who invested in these sectors were able to leverage their business 
links, possibly via a migrant network and therefore increase trade. This form of pro-
trade migration is indicative of the network effects suggested by the existing 
economic geography literature. Similarly the existing trade literature found a greater 
pro-trade effect for differentiated products amongst ethnic networks. This suggests 
that Taiwanese migrant operated by providing market information across 
international borders about export opportunities.  
 
Taiwanese ethnic networks provided a deterrent against opportunistic behaviour 
through enforcement of community sanctions. Taiwanese entrepreneurs were out-
siders in the South African RIDP zones. Although nominally protected by the trade 
treaties (BITT’s), institutionalised racism precluded them from engaging in formal 
credit or domestic networks. Moreover, given the unstable institutional environment 
in South Africa, they operated in a close business community forming the 
“Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce in Africa” thus encouraging further cooperation.  
 
As such, it is possible that network linkages were helping to overcome the informal 
barriers to trade imposed by the racial isolation and increasing risk of operating in 
South Africa during a state of emergency. Taiwanese entrepreneurs could use their 
co-ethnic linkages to cooperate by sharing market knowledge or credit. This 
promoted an increase in exports to Taiwan, not only by signalling home market 
preferences, but also by providing community enforcement that deterred violations 
of contracts in a weak legal environment. For example, Weidenbaum and Hughes 
(1996) noted how in Asia “if a business owner violates an agreement, he is 
blacklisted. This is far worse than being sued, because the entire Chinese network 
will refrain from doing business with the guilty party”.80Similarly in South Africa, 
Hart (2002a) found that some of the older Taiwanese firms in KwaZulu Natal 
supplied credit to the new firms. This would suggest a high level of trust amongst the 
network of suppliers and contractors in the RIDP zones. Migrant networks not only 
facilitated the initial migration decision but also acted as a force for perpetuating 
migration. It became easier for potential Taiwanese enterprisers to move given the 
manufacturing complex in which they were embedded and the trust that existed in 
their network. The new factories, with established links in the migrant network, then 
perpetuated an ongoing cycle linking potential buyers and markets through networks.  
 
  
                                                        
80 Weidenbaum & Hughes (1996, p. 36) 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Appendix A 
 
 
Figure 3: Plots the growth of bilateral trade and migration between South 
Africa and Taiwan (1975 - 1995)  
 
Source: Estimates of Taiwanese migration and population series assembled 
from the Board for the Decentralisation, business license applications 
(National Archive, Pretoria, RSA). Bilateral trade is assembled from the South 
African Revenue Service (1975 - 1985), National Treasury (1986 - 1992), and 
the South African Revenue service (1993 - 1995).  
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Change in Regional Bilateral Trade (1975 based to 100)  
 
Source: Trade series assembled from Foreign Trade Statistics 1975 - 1985, with 
supplementary statistics from the Department of Trade and Industry, Garner (1994) 
and IMD direction of trade statistics (1986 -1990). South African Revenue Services 
using HS codes provided the years 1991 - 1995. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
Figure 5: European and Taiwanese Migration between 1961 and 1994  
 
Source: European - Department of Internal Affairs, Annual Reports, The 
National Archive, Pretoria, and The Government Publications Library, 
University of Cape Town (European: Germany, France and US). 
Taiwanese Migration and population series assembled from the Board for 
the Decentralisation, business license applications (National Archive, 
Pretoria, RSA).  
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Appendix D  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Taiwanese annual migration and total population (broken 
line) between 1974 and 2000 
 
Source: Estimates of Taiwanese migration and population series assembled 
from the Board for the Decentralisation, business license applications 
(National Archive, Pretoria, RSA).  
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Appendix E 
 
 
Note: Column 2 (Ref Price) denotes whether the SIC category could be considered a reference price good, i.e. 
undifferentiated commodity and therefore infers no information premium. Goods that possess no information 
premium are categorised as homogenous and therefore grouped as such. While those that have no reference 
price, are categorised as a differentiated are therefore subject to an information premium. For the purpose of 
this analysis, this bivariate categorisation is used to ascertain whether migration increased the trade in 
information intensive differentiated products. 
 
Figure 7: Sections Of The Standard Industrial Classifications 
Harmonised System 
!"55"!"
APPENDIX(B(
"
" SECTIONS(OF(THE(HARMONISED(SYSTEM(
Section( Ref(Price( Chapter( Description(
I( YES( 1(to(5( Live"animals,"animal"products."
II( YES( 6(to(14( Vegetable"products."
III( NO( 15(
(
Animal"or"vegetable"fats"and"oils"and"their"cleavage"products;"
prepared"edible"fats;"animal"or"vegetable"waxes."
IV( NO( 16(to(24( Prepared"foodstuffs,"beverages,"spirits,"and"vinegar;"tobacco"and"
manufactured"tobacco"substitutes."
V( YES( 25(to(27( Mineral"products."
VI( NO( 28(to(38( Products"of"the"chemicals"or"allied"industries."
VII( NO( 39(to(40( Plastics"and"articles"thereof;"rubber"and"articles"thereof."
VIII( NO( 41(to(43(
(
(
Raw"hides"and"skins,"leather,"fur"skins"and"articles"thereof;"saddler"
and"harness,"travel"articles,"handbags"and"similar"containers;"
articles"of"animal"gut"(other"than"silkworm!gut)."
IX( NO( 44(to(46(
(
(
Wood"and"articles"of"wood,"wood"charcoal,"cork"and"articles"of"cork,"
manufactures"of"straw,"of"esparto"or"of"other"plaiting"material,"
basket"ware"and"wickerwork."
X( YES( 47(to(49(
(
Pulp"of"wood"or"of"other"fibrous"cellulosic"material;"waste"and"scrap"
of"paper"or"of"paperboard;"paper"and"paperboard"and"articles"
thereof."
XI( NO( 50(to(63( Textiles"and"textile"articles."
XII( NO( 64(to(67(
(
(
Footwear,"headgear,"umbrellas,"sun"umbrellas,"walking!sticks,"seat!
sticks,"whips,"riding!crops"and"parts"thereof;"prepared"feathers"and"
articles"made"therewith,"artificial"flowers,"articles"of"human"hair."
XIII( NO( 68(to(70(
(
Articles"of"stone,"plaster,"cement,"asbestos,"mica"or"similar"
materials,"ceramic"products,"glass"and"glassware."
XIV( NO( 71(
(
Natural"or"cultured"pearls,"precious"or"semi!precious"stones,"
precious"metals,"metals"clad"with"precious"metal"and"articles"
thereof;"imitation"jewellery,"coins."
XV( YES( 72(to(83( Base"metals"and"articles"of"base"metal."
XVI( NO( 84(to(85(
(
(
Machinery"and"mechanical"appliances,"electrical"equipment;"parts"
thereof,"sound"recorders"and"reproducers,"television"image"and"
sound"recorders"and"reproducers,"and"parts"and"accessories"of"such"
articles."
XVII( NO( 86(to(89( Vehicles,"aircraft,"vessels"and"associated"transport"equipment."
( NO( 90(to(92(
(
(
Optical,"photographic,"cinematographic,"measuring,"checking,"
precision,"medical"or"surgical"instruments"and"apparatus,"clocks"
and"watches,"musical"instruments;"parts"and"accessories"thereof."
XIX( NO( 94(to(96( Miscellaneous"manufactured"articles."
XX( NO( 97( Works"of"art,"collectors’"pieces"and"antiques."
XXI( NO( J( Other"unclassified"goods."
XXII( NO( J( Special"classification"provisions:""Original"Equipment"Components"
XXIII( NO( 98( Special"classification"provisions:""Other"Miscellaneous"OEM"
Component"
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Table 5: SIC Percentage Differentiated Exports to Taiwan (1975 - 1995) 
